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Abstract
Background: The public health community has become increasingly critical of the role that powerful corporations
play in driving unhealthy diets, one of the leading contributors to the global burden of disease. While a substantial
amount of work has examined the political strategies used by dominant processed food manufacturers that
undermine public health, less attention has been paid to their use of market strategies to build and consolidate
power. In this light, this paper aimed to systematically review and synthesise the market strategies deployed by
dominant processed food manufacturers to increase and consolidate their power.
Methods: A systematic review and document analysis of public health, business, legal and media content
databases (Scopus, Medline, ABI Inform, Business Source Complete, Thomas Reuters Westlaw, Lexis Advance, Factiva,
NewsBank), and grey literature were conducted. Data extracted were analysed thematically using an approach
informed by Porter’s ‘Five Forces’ framework.
Results: 213 documents met inclusion criteria. The market strategies (n=21) and related practices of dominant
processed food manufacturers identified in the documents were categorised into a typological framework
consisting of six interconnected strategic objectives: i) reduce intense competition with equivalent sized rivals and
maintaining dominance over smaller rivals; ii) raise barriers to market entry by new competitors; iii) counter the
threat of market disruptors and drive dietary displacement in favour of their products; iv) increase firm buyer power
over suppliers; v) increase firm seller power over retailers and distributors; and vi) leverage informational power
asymmetries in relations with consumers.
Conclusions: The typological framework is well-placed to inform general and jurisdiction-specific market strategy
analyses of dominant processed food manufacturers, and has the potential to assist in identifying countervailing
public policies, such as those related to merger control, unfair trading practices, and public procurement, that could
be used to address market-power imbalances as part of efforts to improve population diets.
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Background
Unhealthy diets are one of the leading contributors to
the global burden of disease, accounting for an estimated
11 million deaths each year and approximately 15% of
all years lost to ill-health [1]. The public health commu-
nity has increasingly become critical of the role of
powerful private actors, such as transnational food man-
ufacturers, in driving unhealthy diets through the shap-
ing of food supply chains, food environments and
consumer behaviour [2–5]. To date, the main focus of
such work, including as part of the emerging field of the
commercial determinants of health (CDoH), has exam-
ined: the links between unhealthy food products and ad-
verse population health outcomes; the underlying global
drivers and institutional arrangements that promote cor-
porate interests and transnationalise their activities; and
the use of corporate political strategies, such as political
donations, lobbying, and regulatory capture, by domin-
ant processed food manufacturers that undermine public
health policy and practice [6–10].
To date, however, the market strategies deployed by
processed food manufacturers have received limited at-
tention from the public health community. Most public
health research into the market strategies of food com-
panies has focused on the public health implications of
marketing, product reformulation, and food labelling
[11–18]. However, large firms are known to deploy a
wide range of strategies to protect their business models
and products from adverse regulation, while simultan-
eously building and preserving market dominance and
profits [19–21]. In order to understand the ways in
which companies in the food industry act to maximise
profits and power, it is critical that the public health
community has the tools to monitor and analyse the full
range of strategies used.
Drawing on strategic management literature, ‘market
strategies’ can be defined as concerted patterns of ac-
tions taken in the market environment for the purpose
of improving corporate performance (i.e. maximising
profits and shareholder returns), for example, in actions
such as pricing or merger and acquisitions [19]. From
the perspective of Michael Porter, who is often portrayed
as the founder of modern market strategy, effective de-
ployment of market strategies requires an understanding
of the competitive structure of the industry in question
[19, 22]. For example, in an industry characterised by in-
tense rivalry, a firm unable to compete on price may
choose to instead target a new consumer segment of the
market by adapting the features of its product or service
to the target demographic. As another example, an in-
cumbent firm may decide to acquire new firms that
enter the market to reduce the risk of losing market
share [22]. Effectively, a firm’s choice of appropriate
market strategies, according to Porter, involves assessing
how weaknesses in the competitiveness of an industry
can be leveraged in order to generate profits [21]. Such a
perspective highlights the links between the deployment
of effective market strategies and the potential need for
government intervention to mitigate or prevent the use
of strategies that restrict competition [23].
Importantly, market strategies operate in tandem with
non-market strategies. Non-market strategies include a
cluster of practices that are designed to improve overall
corporate performance by influencing the intercon-
nected policy, regulatory, institutional, ideological and
broader socio-political structures that shape market en-
vironments [19, 24]. In many cases, the distinction be-
tween market and non-market strategies can be
artificial, as both are often collapsed into single actions
or activities undertaken by firms. For example, corporate
social responsibility strategies are often perceived as hav-
ing both a market-strategy dimension (e.g. by increasing
brand value) and a non-market strategy dimension (e.g.
through gaining political and consumer legitimacy) [25].
As such, analysis of market strategies often cannot be di-
vorced from analysis of non-market strategies, as they
can be mutually interdependent and overlapping [20].
Nevertheless, considering market strategies independ-
ently and exclusively is valuable and important as a
heuristic device, especially for understanding how
market-based power imbalances are created or exacer-
bated, and, more broadly, for understanding corporate
power and behaviours [26].
In this paper, we focus on the market strategies used
by processed food and beverage manufacturers with con-
centrated and substantial market power (hereinafter
dominant food companies). Many of these dominant
food companies are transnational in nature, at least from
a production and consumption perspective. However,
there are several cases where particular companies are
dominant in only one national market. In addition, it is
important to highlight that markets have geographical
boundaries, and regulatory agencies typically interpret
market power as being confined within these boundaries
[27]. The majority of dominant food companies predom-
inately manufacture and distribute branded processed
food products [3, 28], defined, for the purposes of this
paper, as firms that process post-harvest agricultural
commodities (as well as intermediate inputs from pri-
mary processing firms and/or synthetic food ingredient
manufacturers) into processed foodstuffs [29]. We make
a distinction between primary and secondary processors.
Primary processors typically add value by processing raw
agricultural commodities, such as refining grains, crush-
ing oilseeds or slaughtering animals for meat packing
[30]. Examples of prominent firms that undertake pri-
mary processing activities include JBS, Archer Daniels
Midland, and Bunge. In comparison, secondary
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processors primarily add value to processed ingredients,
such as corn syrup or refined sugar, by manufacturing
highly processed foods [30]. Examples of prominent
firms that undertake secondary processing activities in-
clude The Coca-Cola Company, the world’s largest soft
drink manufacturer, and Nestle, the world’s largest food
manufacturer that operates across a number of different
processed food markets, including confectionery, ice
cream, and processed dairy products [31, 32]. It is im-
portant to note that many large firms operate across
functional levels in the food value chain, and many food
manufacturers undertake both primary and secondary
food processing activities.
In many food industries across the world, the proc-
essed food manufacturing sector is highly oligopolistic in
terms of the market structure (i.e., dominated by only a
few firms) and characterisable by a large number of sup-
pliers that are only able to sell their products to a small
number of dominant food companies (i.e. these consti-
tuting an oligopsony) [33]. Additionally, processed foods
markets typically have substantial barriers to market
entry that further consolidate the market power of in-
cumbent firms [33].
The concentrated market power of dominant food
companies is a public health concern because it confers
them with the ability to promote and reinforce food
value chains and food environments geared towards the
production and consumption of their products, many of
which are highly processed. We draw from the food clas-
sification system NOVA to support the rationale for fo-
cusing on dominant processed food companies (see
Fig. 1) [34]. The NOVA system, an increasingly used
food classification system in public health nutrition-
related research, categorises food products into four
groups according to their level of processing [35, 36].
The first group is unprocessed and minimally processed
foods. The second group is processed culinary ingredi-
ents, which includes oils, butter, sugar, lard, and salt.
The third group is processed foods, which are made by
adding salt, oil, sugar or other substances from the sec-
ond group to foods from the first group. The fourth and
final group are ultra-processed foods (UPFs), which in-
clude soft drinks, confectionery, sweet biscuits, ice-
cream, and savoury snacks [37, 38]. UPFs are made from
combining substances derived from foods with synthetic
additives, typically via a series of industrial techniques
and processes. Importantly, a key feature of UPFs is that
they contain food substances that are never, or at most
very rarely, used in domestic kitchens, meaning that they
are almost exclusively made by processed food manufac-
turers [34]. UPFs now amount to around half of the total
dietary energy consumed in highly developed market
Fig. 1 A schematic conceptualisation of different pathways in the food value chain based on the level of processing of end-products
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economies, and their sales in less developed market
economies are increasing rapidly [34]. Studies have
shown that a greater contribution of UPFs to total en-
ergy intake are associated with poorer diet quality [39–
41], higher risks of all-cause mortality [42, 43], obesity
[44, 45], and a range of diet-related chronic diseases, in-
cluding depression [46–52].
A second important public health implication of the
well-recognised concentrated market power of dominant
food companies is that firms use their market power to
generate profits in excess of what could occur in com-
petitive markets. This accumulation of excessive material
resources can, in turn, be used to fund corporate strat-
egies and practices that undermine public health, such
as lobbying, intense marketing, public relations, and the
funding of scientific research and institutions [2–4, 53,
54].
In light of the current gaps in the public health litera-
ture, the aim of this review was to systematically review
the market strategies deployed by dominant processed
food manufacturers to build and consolidate their
power, and to develop a typological market strategy
framework to inform comprehensive analysis of the mar-
ket strategies and practices used by dominant processed
food manufacturers from a public health perspective.
Methods
This review was undertaken in accordance with the Pre-
ferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement [55]. Original stud-
ies, reviews, commentaries, editorials, books and book
chapters, working papers, online news articles, court
case summaries, market research reports, and web docu-
ments from intergovernmental and non-governmental
organisations were included if they met the inclusion
criteria.
Search strategy
The search strategy was developed with the assistance of
a specialist librarian. Preliminary search testing was con-
ducted to find keyword search terms that captured the
market strategies used by dominant food companies to
exercise or consolidate market power (refer to supple-
mentary file for detailed search strings). Public health,
social sciences, and business and strategic management
literature were searched via Scopus, Web of Science,
Medline, Business Source Complete, and ABI Inform da-
tabases. Competition law and policy literature was
searched using Thomas Reuters Westlaw and Lexis Ad-
vance. We used Factiva and NewsBank to search online
news articles. A grey literature search was conducted
using Google Scholar, Google Advanced Search, the
market research databases Euromonitor International
(Passport) and IBIS World, and a targeted search of the
websites of the following intergovernmental and non-
governmental organisations: the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), the International Panel of
Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food), and
ETC Group. Finally, backward snowballing was applied
in which relevant references of the identified documents
were also reviewed. Databases were searched on 7 July
2020, with all results exported and duplicates removed.
Grey literature searches were conducted between 8 and
10 July 2020. The first 10 pages of Google Scholar and
Google were screened. Citation searches were conducted
between July and September 2020.
Literature selection
The review attempted to identify documents that de-
scribed or discussed the use of market strategies and
practices by dominant food companies. Titles, abstracts,
executive summaries and tables of contents (where rele-
vant) were screened for all search results. Documents
were included if they focused on market-based strategies
used by dominant food companies, with discussion of
the use of market strategies as a means of exercising
power vis-à-vis other market-based actors, e.g., other
food manufacturers, firms at different functional levels
of the food value chain, and consumers. Documents
were excluded if they were not published in English. Fol-
lowing screening, available full texts were retrieved,
reviewed and tabulated by one of the authors.
Quality assessment
Given the diversity and multi-disciplinary nature of the
data, we considered the application of standard risk of
bias assessment tools, e.g. the Cochrane Handbook for
Systematic Reviews [56], to be inappropriate. Instead,
quality assessment was performed by categorising the
sources of data into two different groups. The first group
was data that were collected from peer-reviewed articles,
court case proceedings and summaries, and authoritative
reports from inter-governmental organisations. The sec-
ond group was data sourced from all other documents,
e.g., online media content, market research reports, and
working papers. We considered the first group to be of
higher quality given that the documents were much less
likely to be subject to author bias relative to the second
group.
Data extraction, coding and synthesis
Data extraction was undertaken by the lead author. Data
extracted from each text included author(s), date, title,
and the discussed market-based activity (or activities)
undertaken by the dominant food company (or
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companies). Generalised discussions of market-based ac-
tivities of dominant companies active in the food manu-
facturing sector were also included. The market-based
activities were synthesised and categorised into practices
(i.e., a specific type of activity) and strategies (i.e., a con-
certed set of practices deployed to attain a goal).
To inform the process of categorising the consolidated
strategies and related practices, we initially developed a
list of strategic objectives based on Porter’s ‘Five Com-
petitive Forces’ framework (hereinafter the Five Forces
framework). The Five Forces framework is one of the
most well-known strategic management and business
frameworks [21, 22]. From a market strategy perspective,
the Five Forces framework outlines how firms can select
and use market strategies based on identifying and lever-
aging the power imbalances that exist within the market
environment [23]. The five forces and their related stra-
tegic implications can be described as follows [21, 22]: i)
reduce competitive rivalry through the use of strategies
to reduce intense competition, especially with large ri-
vals, and to maintain dominance over smaller rivals; ii)
counter threat of market entrants by raising barriers to
market entry to make it harder for new firms to enter
the market; iii) counter threat of substitutes by deploying
strategies that protect the firm from having their buyers
switch to substitute products; iv) increase seller power by
consolidating power over buyers; and v) increase buyer
power by consolidating power over suppliers. We
adapted the Five Forces framework for application to the
food manufacturing sector by considering ‘substitutes’ to
be substitute food products (regardless of their level of
processing), ‘suppliers’ to be firms from upstream func-
tional levels (e.g., food production, primary processing),
and ‘buyers’ to be both downstream firms (e.g., retailers,
food service outlets) and consumers. In addition, we sep-
arated the strategic objective to ‘increase seller power’
into two to take into account the differences from a pub-
lic health perspective between the deployment of strat-
egies used by dominant food companies vis-à-vis
retailers and distributors compared to consumers.
The process of consolidating strategies and related
practices, and categorising based on the abovementioned
strategic objectives, was conducted in an iterative man-
ner. The initial categorisations were reviewed by all of
the authors, with discrepancies resolved via a consulta-
tive process. In undertaking the categorisations, we
recognised that, in some cases, dominant food compan-
ies may use the same practice as part of multiple strat-
egies, and, due to the dynamic nature of markets, the list
of practices categorised under each strategy is unlikely
to be exhaustive. Accordingly, the practices identified
are best considered as ‘illustrative’.
Summarised material was presented as a novel typo-
logical market strategy framework to inform analysis of
the market strategies and related practices used by dom-
inant processed food manufacturers to consolidate
power from a public health perspective.
Results
Database searching returned 1115 results. After grey lit-
erature and snowball searching, 213 documents were in-
cluded for final review (see supplementary file for PRIM
SA flow chart). In the evidence group considered to be
of higher quality, documents included peer-reviewed ar-
ticles (n=67), legal case summaries (n=24), and authori-
tative intergovernmental reports (n=12). In the evidence
group deemed to be of lower quality, documents in-
cluded online media content (n=60), market, industry or
investor research reports (n=22), conference papers and
manuscripts (n=15), non-authoritative reports (n=10),
completed doctoral theses (n=3), and one transcribed
speech.
Identified market strategies (n=21) were categorised
according to six interconnected strategic objectives spe-
cific to dominant processed food manufacturers: i) re-
duce intense competition with equivalent sized rivals
and maintain dominance over smaller rivals; ii) raise bar-
riers to market entry by new competitors; iii) counter
the threat of market disruptors and drive dietary dis-
placement in favour of their products; iv) increase firm
buyer power over upstream food supply chain actors; v)
increase firm selling power over downstream food sup-
ply chain actors, and vi) leverage informational power
asymmetries in relations with consumers (see Table 1).
Reduce intense competition with equivalent sized rivals
and maintain dominance over smaller rivals
The review identified six strategies that dominant food
companies employ to reduce intense competition with
large rivals and maintain market dominance over smaller
rivals. Horizontal integration, achieved by acquiring a
rival firm in the same product market, is an important
strategy that increases a firm’s market share and reduces
its number of direct rivals [29, 57–61, 63–82, 239]. Hori-
zontal acquisitions provide a substantial competitive ad-
vantage by allowing the buying firm to increase its
number of brands, achieve economies of scale and econ-
omies of scope, obtain new proprietary technologies and
processes, and by indirectly increasing its buyer and
seller power [58–60, 240]. In some cases, the transaction
value of acquisitions can be extremely large, such as the
$63 billion price tag on Heinz’s takeover of Kraft Foods
in 2015 [29]. The acquisition of food manufacturing
firms in foreign markets is also a key means for domin-
ant food companies to enter and penetrate new markets,
especially those embedded in emerging economies [2, 3,
29, 63, 64, 71, 73, 74, 82–84, 86–92]. Dominant food
companies have largely entered emerging markets via
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Table 1 A typological framework of the strategic objectives and associated market strategies and related practices used by
dominant processed food manufacturers to increase and consolidate market power
Strategic Objective Strategy Illustrative practices Evidence (by group)
Reduce intense competition with
equivalent sized rivals and
maintain dominance over smaller
rivals
Horizontal integration Acquisition of rival in the same product and
geographic market
Group I: [29, 57–70]
Group II: [71–82]
Direct transnational expansion Direct investment in foreign markets through
acquisition of foreign food manufacturing firms
Group I: [2, 3, 29, 63,
64, 83–85]
Group II: [71, 73, 74,
82, 86–92]
Substantial investments in locally acquired firms to
penetrate emerging markets via boosting
production and marketing capabilities
Group I: [2]
Group II: [79, 88]
Horizontal collusion Explicitly collude by entering price and/or output
fixing arrangements with rivals
Group I: [63, 93–99]
Group II: [100–106]
Tacitly collude with rivals by coordinating
behaviour
Group I: [33, 96,
107]Group II: [106]
Horizontal collaboration Risk-spreading arrangements with rivals to
penetrate product markets
Group I: [29, 108]
Group II: [61, 82, 109–
115]
Risk-spreading arrangements with local
manufacturing firms in foreign markets to
penetrate new geographic markets
Group I: [116]




Exploit dominant market position to increase
prices and profit margins
Group I: [107, 118]
Anti-competitive pricing practices to push
competitors out of markets, e.g. predatory pricing
and territorial price discrimination
Group I: [119–124]
Group II: [125]
Create, maintain and increase
consumer demand
Invest in intense and aggressive marketing
practices to create/maintain/increase consumer
demand for branded products in new and existing
markets
Group I: [2, 3, 11, 84,
85, 116, 126–129]
Group II: [91, 130–
133]
Segment consumer markets through marketing
and price segmentation practices
Group I: [15, 64, 83,
84, 116, 134, 135]
Group II: [109, 132,
133, 136–140]
Raise barriers to market entry by
new competitors
Develop, acquire and protect
value of brands and other
intangible assets
Make substantial investments in marketing
practices to increase and protect the equity of
owned brands and brand loyalty
Group I: [29, 58, 63,
64, 118, 141, 142]
Group II: [82, 132,
143–152]
Build brand equity and loyalty by differentiating
products based on different qualities and
characteristics
Group I: [33, 64, 107,
134, 153–156]
Group II: [81, 109, 113,
117, 130, 132, 138,
140, 146, 147, 157–
160]
Increase value of owned intangible assets via
acquisition of intangible assets of other firms, and
make substantial investments in product and
process innovation
Group I: [65, 66, 161,
162]
Group II: [163, 164]
Protect intangible assets, including brands,
through intellectual property right channels
whenever possible
Group I: [64, 165]
Group II: [91, 166–
169]
Exploit economies of scale
(production, marketing and
financial)
Increase productive efficiency and minimise
marginal cost of production through practices that
achieve production economies of scale
Group I: [33, 58, 64,
119, 161, 162]
Group II: [79, 88, 132,
147, 149, 150, 163,
170]
Exploit marketing economies of scale by spreading
large marketing budgets across a greater range of
effective marketing media
Group II: [74]
Exploit financial economies of scale to make large Group I: [171, 172]
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Table 1 A typological framework of the strategic objectives and associated market strategies and related practices used by
dominant processed food manufacturers to increase and consolidate market power (Continued)
Strategic Objective Strategy Illustrative practices Evidence (by group)
capital investments and to deploy cost-cutting fi-
nancial strategies (e.g. transfer pricing)
Group II: [88, 147, 151,
152, 173]
Supply chain control Control distribution channels using trading
practices such as exclusive dealing arrangements,
predatory foreclosure, category ‘captaincy’, slotting
fees, and calendar marketing agreements
Group I: [29, 58, 99,
118, 123, 127, 153,
174–182]
Group II: [101, 147,
183–188]
Establish distribution networks in hard-to-access
areas
Group I: [135, 154]
Group II: [147]
Supply diversification and competitive sourcing to
secure cheap inputs
Group I: [116, 162,
189, 190]
Group II: [82, 132, 191,
192]
Update and streamline supply management
practices (e.g., automation in production
processes) to boost productive efficiency, minimise
transaction costs and promote product
differentiation
Group I: [155, 193–
195]
Group II: [82, 147,
196–198]
Control ancillary activities by acquiring firms and
related assets in ancillary industries, e.g. business
management services, storage and transport
industries
Group I: [162, 199]
Group II: [200]
Substantial investments in Big Data platform
technologies to acquire, control and manipulate
large amounts of supply chain and consumer
related information
Group II: [132, 201]
Counter the threat of market
disruptors and drive dietary




Acquisition of firms in substitute product markets
(domestic or cross-border)
Group I: [29, 57, 58,
63, 107, 156, 171, 202]
Group II: [32, 74, 79,
88, 89, 109, 159, 164,
167, 203–206]
Acquisition of firms in related (e.g. healthcare, pet
food) or unrelated industries (conglomerate)
Group I: [107, 108,
207]
Group II: [72, 109,
208]
Substantial investments in the development of
new products in response to consumer trends
Group II: [32, 206,
209]
Enter and penetrate related product markets
through strategic alliances, joint ventures and co-
branding agreements
Group I: [210]
Group II: [74, 109, 113,
211]
Control market disruptors Operate as venture capitalists and business
incubators in order to eliminate the threat of start-
ups and capitalise on and internalise successful
start-ups
Group II: [109, 206]
Drive dietary displacement and
adaption in favour of branded
processed foods over
alternatives
Engineer hyperpalatable, quasi-addictive, and aes-
thetically and texturally pleasing foods
Group I: [2, 34, 85,
129, 154, 212]
Group II: [213, 214]
Drive changes in food consumption habits, e.g.
promotion of snacking over regular meals, that
favour the consumption of branded processed
foods
Group I: [85]
Keep price of branded products low in value-
based food markets by taking advantage of econ-
omies of scale and cheap commodity inputs
Group I: [2, 3, 129]
Group II: [91]
Increase firm buyer power via
exercising power over upstream
food supply chain actors
Vertical integration (backwards) Acquisition of upstream firms and related assets Group I: [58, 63, 107,
194, 195, 215, 216]
Group II: [132, 217]
Vertical control (backwards) Control access to and use of inputs, e.g. land, Group I: [29, 33, 58,
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acquisitions, strategies that are often in response to stag-
nating sales revenue in their home markets [2, 3, 29, 91,
92, 116]. Following entry, dominant food companies
often further penetrate emerging markets by investing
substantial amounts of capital in boosting production
and marketing capabilities [2, 79, 88, 116].
It was identified that dominant food companies also
undertake risk-spreading arrangements, such as strategic
alliances, licensing agreements, franchising agreements,
and joint ventures, in order to penetrate both new and
existing product and geographic markets [61, 74, 79, 82,
86, 87, 109, 110, 112, 114–116]. One noteworthy ex-
ample is the joint venture Cereal Partners Worldwide,
created in 1991 between Nestlé and General Mills, which
at the time united the marketing capacity of Nestlé with
the production know-how of General Mills to penetrate
the global breakfast cereal market (to the detriment of
Kellogg) [162]. Moreover, risk-spreading arrangements
with local manufacturing firms can allow dominant food
companies to enter new geographic markets without the
need to make big and often risky investments, while still
being able to benefit from local distribution channels,
manufacturing capabilities, and market/consumer/regu-
latory knowledge. Many dominant food companies, as
global brand owners, can also decide to use licensing
agreements – whereby they permit local firms to manu-
facture and distribute a branded product within a speci-
fied region – to generate revenue without taking the risk
of investing in local manufacturing or distribution activ-
ities [61, 64, 79, 111, 113].
The review identified cases where dominant food com-
panies have resorted to collusion to reduce intense com-
petition and maximise profits. Despite explicit collusion
being illegal in many national legal systems, a number of
cases were identified in which dominant food companies
were reported to have entered price and/or output fixing
arrangements, forming cartels with rivals in the same
product market [33, 63, 93–107]. In 2008, a German
court found that a number of large branded chocolate
manufacturers, including Kraft Foods and Alfred Ritter,
Table 1 A typological framework of the strategic objectives and associated market strategies and related practices used by
dominant processed food manufacturers to increase and consolidate market power (Continued)
Strategic Objective Strategy Illustrative practices Evidence (by group)
production-related plant and equipment, crop var-
ieties, water
64, 141, 195, 218]
Group II: [102, 201,
217, 219, 220]
Use private standards to control upstream firms Group I: [29, 190, 221,
222]
Group II: [132]
Exert power over suppliers through the use of
unfair contract agreements
Group I: [29, 58, 189,
223, 224]
Group II: [225, 226]
Vertical coordination
(backwards)
Coordinate upstream activities through risk-
spreading arrangements (e.g., strategic alliances
and joint ventures) with upstream firms
Group I: [64, 108, 227,
228]
Group II: [82, 217, 229,
230]
Increase firm seller power via
exercising power over downstream
actors
Vertical integration (forwards) Acquisition of downstream firms and related
assets
Group I: [107, 153,
195, 215]
Group II: [187, 198,
231]
Vertical control (forwards) Control distribution channels using practices such
as exclusive dealing arrangements, loyalty rebates,
product bundling, resale price maintenance, and
territorial supply contracts
Group I: [99, 174, 181,
232]
Group II: [124]
Vertical coordination (forwards) Coordinate downstream processes and activities
through risk-spreading arrangements
Group I: [228, 233]
Group II: [206]
Vertical collusion Collude with retailers to set up price-fixing ar-




asymmetries in their relations with
consumers
Drive demand within vulnerable
consumer groups
Target vulnerable population groups with
integrated marketing communication practices
and use of multiple marketing channels, especially
digital channels
Group I: [11, 13–16,
234]
Exploit product and process
related information asymmetries
Withhold, manipulate or use misleading process
and product-related information on food labels via
practices such as the use of deceptive health and
nutrition claims, misleading marketing claims (e.g.
unfinished or irrelevant claims), and greenwashing
Group I: [33, 235–237]
Group II: [140, 238]
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had colluded to coordinate a series of price increases –
in some cases around 15–25% – in the German market
[98]. Explicit collusive practices, such as the sharing of
sensitive market information, are not specific to illegal
cartels and can be facilitated through legal channels such
as trade groups and associations [63, 101]. However, col-
lusion in processed food markets has been shown to
often be tacit, rather than explicit. Tacit collusion usu-
ally occurs in concentrated markets, such as carbonated
soft drink markets, when large rivals that compete over
time and across regions repeatedly interact and thus
begin to anticipate one and another, allowing them to
coordinate behaviour with little or no direct communi-
cation [33, 96, 106, 107].
It was revealed that dominant food companies at times
use a number of anti-competitive pricing strategies as a
means of maintaining market dominance over smaller ri-
vals. Food companies in positions of market dominance
were shown to exploit their ‘price making’ capabilities in
which they set prices without having to make reference
to the pricing strategies of rivals [107, 118]. In such
cases, dominant firms can choose to set their prices high
in order to increase profit margins to levels higher than
what would be possible under genuinely competitive
conditions. Conversely, dominant firms can also set their
prices at very low levels to force out would-be competi-
tors. This practice, known as predatory pricing, occurs
when dominant firms set prices at very low levels, at
times even below the marginal cost of production, for
extended periods of time to drive out smaller rivals lack-
ing the power to absorb consequent losses [119, 121,
124, 125]. Similarly, some dominant food companies
were shown to employ a practice called territorial price
discrimination, whereby predatory prices employed in
certain geographical markets are offset by setting higher
prices in other markets where the targeted rivals are not
active [120, 122].
Dominant food companies are able to leverage their
greater financial, production and market power relative
to smaller rivals by making substantial investments in a
range of practices that increase consumer demand for
their branded products. It is important to note that the
use of this market strategy also raises barriers to market
entry, and as such, links with strategies discussed in the
next section (refer to 3.2. Raise barriers to market entry
by new competitors). Dominant food companies report-
edly spend enormous amounts of money on intense and
aggressive marketing, including product placements and
price promotions. This maintains consumer demand for
their branded products in existing markets, as well as
creating and increasing demand in new markets [2, 3,
11, 84, 85, 91, 116, 126–130, 132, 133]. Furthermore,
relative to smaller food manufacturers, dominant food
companies tend to be able to negotiate more
advantageous product placement and trade promotion
agreements with retailers [127].
Similarly, dominant food companies often have the ne-
cessary resources to aggressively pursue market segmen-
tation strategies, especially in relation to developing
niche markets [15, 64, 83, 84, 109, 116, 120, 132, 133,
135–140]. This strategy involves segmenting different
groups of consumers with differentiated products and
targeted marketing based on their demographics (e.g.
children), income and economic status (e.g. lower in-
come groups), psychographics (e.g. consumer beliefs,
values, motivations, priorities) and behavioural charac-
teristics (e.g. purchasing behaviour). Market segmenta-
tion can also have a geographic dimension, for example,
as evidenced by dominant food companies investing sub-
stantial amounts of money into adapting their global
brands to the local tastes and habits of different con-
sumer groups around the world, a process often cap-
tured by the term ‘glocalisation’ [82, 83, 116, 137].
Furthermore, market segmentation permits firms to tier
or differentiate prices, maximising sales and profits by
gearing prices to the different abilities to pay across na-
tional markets.
Raise barriers to market entry by new competitors
The review identified three broad strategies used by
dominant food companies to raise barriers to market
entry in order to prevent unwanted competition, con-
solidate market power, and facilitate profit maximisation.
The identified strategies were developing, acquiring and
protecting the value of their brands and other intangible
assets; exploiting production, marketing and financial
economies of scale; and obtaining supply chain control.
Dominant food companies often invest substantial
amounts of capital in increasing and protecting the value
of their brands, often referred to as brand equity [29, 58,
63, 81, 82, 118, 132, 141–143, 146, 148–152]. For some
perspective, The Coca-Cola Company’s (TCCC) brand
portfolio was valued at US$63.4 billion in 2019 [241].
Building a brand is costly and time consuming, giving
incumbent firms with existing brand loyalty an enor-
mous advantage over new market entrants [33, 82, 132].
Brand equity is also crucial for dominant food compan-
ies to maintain bargaining power over large supermar-
kets, given that ‘must stock’ brands are much less likely
to displaced by supermarket own brands compared with
the lesser known brands of smaller food manufacturers
[64, 141, 143–145].
A critical aspect of developing and protecting brand
equity is product differentiation [33]. Product differenti-
ation describes a strategy of differentiating a firm’s prod-
ucts from those of existing or potential rivals. This is
achieved by differentiating products based on character-
istics such as taste, convenience, appearance, production
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processed, healthfulness, marketing arrangements, and
the ecological implications of production and consump-
tion [33, 64, 81, 86, 107, 109, 113, 130, 132, 134, 138,
140, 146, 147, 153–160]. For effective product differenti-
ation to occur, product consistency is vital. In this re-
spect, dominant food companies have the resources and
supply chain control to ensure a large, consistent supply
of products that can fulfil specified external or in-house
quality standards [33].
Beyond brand equity, dominant food companies invest
substantial amounts of money to develop and acquire
other types of intangible assets. This includes new prod-
uct and process innovations (such as inorganic micro-
coatings on candy, or the fortification of foods using
nano-capsules), brand and packaging designs, and for-
mulas. In some circumstances, these intangible assets
can be protected through intellectual property rights
channels, conferring a significant long term advantage to
the firm [64, 91, 165–169].
Another key barrier to market entry in many proc-
essed food markets is the fact that dominant food com-
panies have managed to establish economies of scale in
terms of production, marketing and finance. Production
economies of scale – achieved through practices such as
the acquisition of other firms, large-scale investment in
existing production facilities, and investing in advanced
process innovations (e.g., automation) – can optimise
production efficiency and minimise the marginal cost of
production [33, 58, 64, 119, 132, 147, 149, 150, 161–
163]. Dominant food companies also make use of mar-
keting economies of scale in which they can lower the
costs of marketing practices by spreading their market-
ing budget across a range of different and effective mar-
keting media [74]. Regarding financial economies of
scale, dominant food companies are often able to exploit
their ability to access and afford large amounts of cheap
capital to make large capital investments [151, 171]. In
addition, dominant food companies with subsidiaries in
different countries can readily mobilise capital across
borders, enabling them to undertake practices such as
transfer pricing – namely the trading of goods or ser-
vices between subsidiaries – in order to minimise tax
obligations and maximise financial returns [152, 172,
173]. A core financing strategy of Nestlé, for instance,
was described in the literature as locating its trademarks
and patents in Switzerland, its home jurisdiction, in
order to set up transnational intra-firm royalty payment
streams designed to assist the repatriation of profits in
tax-effective ways [172].
The ability of dominant food companies to control the
processed food supply chain (i.e., ‘supply chain control’)
is another important barrier to market entry. For in-
stance, it was identified that dominant food companies
often leverage their market power vis-à-vis retailers in
order to control distribution channels, including retail
shelf space in supermarkets. An example of a related
trading practice used by dominant food companies is ex-
clusive dealing arrangements, which entails the place-
ment of restrictions on how much rival product the
retailers/distributors are allowed to sell [29, 99, 123, 153,
174, 177, 181, 185, 186, 188]. In some contexts, domin-
ant firms can also aim to be given ‘category captaincy’,
which refers to the situation when retailers give food
manufacturers leading category management roles,
allowing them to arrange and control retail shelf space
[118, 178, 182, 184, 187]. Similarly, dominant food com-
panies can make payments for optimal retail positions,
known as slotting fees, as well as undertaking calendar
marketing agreements, which are payments for preferen-
tial treatment by retailers, such as exclusive in-store ad-
vertising, during a specified period of time [58, 101, 175,
176, 179, 180, 183]. As a case in point, the European
Commission made the decision to address certain trad-
ing practices used by TCCC to control distribution
channels in an anti-competitive manner, which included
forcing a number of distributors to deny access to
TCCC’s rivals and using financial incentives to reserve a
certain part of retail shelf space dedicated to carbonated
soft drinks [181, 242]. Dominant food companies, com-
pared with food manufacturers with less market power,
were also described as being able to negotiate more ad-
vantageous in-store promotional arrangements with re-
tailers [127].
Given their integration into and access to input mar-
kets in different markets around the world, dominant
food companies have the ability to pursue supply diversi-
fication and competitive sourcing as a means of securing
cheaper supplies [82, 116, 132, 162, 189–192]. Addition-
ally, dominant food companies often take advantage of
advanced supply chain management practices – such as
the use of enterprise resource planning software, and
automation innovations in quality management and pro-
duction – to minimise transaction costs, increase pro-
duction efficiencies, and ensure product quality and
differentiation. Dominant food companies were seen to
also acquire or control firms in ancillary industries, such
as those involved with storage and refrigeration [82, 147,
155, 193–198]. TCCC, for example, deployed this strat-
egy in its acquisition of a firm involved in the produc-
tion and distribution of refrigeration units in the
European Common Market [199]. Finally, an important
supply chain control strategy that can raise barriers to
market entry is the ability to obtain, control, and ma-
nipulate consumer, market and supply chain-related in-
formation. A key means to achieve this was reported as
being the use of costly Big Data platform technologies
that mine, store and interpret vast amounts of consumer
data [132, 201].
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Counter the threat of market disruptors and drive dietary
displacement in favour of their products
The review identified three strategies used by dominant
food companies to counter the threat of substitute food
products: product diversification; control market disrup-
tors; and drive dietary displacement and adaption in
favour of branded processed foods over alternatives. The
two main groups of substitute products relative to the
food products made by dominant food companies were
newly developed food products, especially those devel-
oped in response to changing consumer trends (e.g.
plant-based protein meat and dairy product alternatives),
and foods that form part of traditional diets, many of
which are unprocessed or minimally processed.
In many cases, the branded products of dominant food
companies are also in competition with private label
food products across many processed food markets. Pri-
vate label (eg. supermarket ‘own-brand’) food products
are those that are manufactured by a third-party or con-
tract food manufacturer and sold under a retailer’s
name. Given that private label products in the same
market are technically rival products (that typically com-
pete on price), rather than substitute products per se, we
did not include strategies deployed by dominant food
companies to counter the threat of private label com-
panies under this strategy as they are addressed as part
of other strategies. For example, several studies dis-
cussed that dominant food companies with strong
brands are likely to be at a lower risk of losing market
share to private labels compared with small food com-
panies with lesser known brands [64, 141, 143–145].
Furthermore, in certain contexts, dominant food com-
panies may choose to become a third-party manufac-
turer for a retailer as part of risk-spreading arrangement
(a practice that falls under the horizontal collaboration
strategy) [243].
A range of product diversification practices were iden-
tified during the review, including investing large
amounts of money into developing new products [32,
206, 209]; in acquiring firms in substitute markets (e.g. a
soft drink manufacturer acquiring a bottled water manu-
facturer); or by acquiring new brands, especially those
linked with being ‘natural’, ‘healthy’, ‘sustainable’, or ‘or-
ganic’ [29, 32, 57, 58, 63, 74, 79, 88, 89, 107, 109, 156,
159, 164, 167, 171, 202–206]. Similarly, dominant food
companies can also enter substitute markets via strategic
alliances or joint ventures, either with large rivals or
emerging firms [74, 109, 113, 210, 211].
In order to mitigate the risk of market disruptions, a
number of dominant food companies were seen to oper-
ate as venture capitalists and company incubators, espe-
cially in relation to start-up food technology firms [109,
206, 229]. Indeed, a large number of new firms entering
processed food markets are funded by the in-house
venture capital programs of dominant food companies,
e.g., Nestle’s Terra Accelerator and The Unilever Foun-
dry [109, 206]. The financing role means the large firms
are then able to cherry pick and internalise the most
successful start-up firms.
Dominant food companies pursue a number of strat-
egies in order to drive dietary displacement away from
traditional foods towards their branded processed food
products. In addition to increasing consumer demand
for their products via intense and aggressive marketing
(refer to section 3.1), dominant food companies invest in
marketing practices to drive changes in consumption
habits, such as the promotion of snacking over regular
meal times [85]. Dominant food companies also invest
substantial amounts of money into engineering hyperpa-
latable, quasi-addictive, and aesthetically and texturally-
pleasing food products [2, 34, 85, 129, 154, 212–214].
For example, a key purpose of their research and devel-
opment programs is to identify ‘bliss points’ for certain
food components (e.g., sugar, salt, fat, and certain addi-
tives) in their products in order to optimise consumer
pleasure [212–214]. Finally, dominant food companies
can take advantage of their production economies of
scale, as well as their ability to access cheap commodity
inputs, to keep the consumer price of their branded
processed food products below that of alternative prod-
ucts [2, 3, 91, 129]. This strategy is particularly import-
ant in food product markets in which price plays a key
role in the purchasing decisions of consumers.
Increase firm buyer power by exercising power over
upstream actors
It was seen during the review that dominant food com-
panies exercise power over upstream actors in the food
supply chain using three related strategies: integration,
control and coordination. Dominant food companies ver-
tically integrate ‘backwards’ by acquiring upstream firms,
including food production firms and primary food pro-
cessors [58, 63, 107, 132, 195, 215, 217]. ‘Backwards’ ver-
tical control can be achieved via the imposition of
contract agreements [29, 58, 102, 189, 223–226]. In
some cases, contract agreements are designed to allow
dominant buyers to impose unfair conditions on their
suppliers, such as permitting the buyer to make unilat-
eral or retroactive changes to the contract [224].
Dominant food companies were also revealed to use
private standards relating to food quality, safety or sus-
tainability as a means of exerting power over their sup-
pliers [29, 132, 190, 221, 222]. Private standards,
referring to standards imposed by one private actor on
another without the involvement of government, can at
times have detrimental effects on small-scale producers.
As an example, private standards enforced by Nestle and
Parmalat relating to the handling and storage of milk
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forced thousands of dairy farmers in Brazil out of busi-
ness, largely because they could neither afford nor access
the necessary capital and technology to fulfil the newly
imposed private standards [132]. In addition, dominant
food companies were revealed to control access to and
use of key inputs, such as land, seeds of certain crop var-
ieties, farming equipment, and water [29, 33, 58, 64, 141,
195, 217–220]. Lastly, the coordination of upstream pro-
cesses and activities can be achieved through the use of
risk-spreading arrangements with upstream firms [64,
82, 108, 227–230].
Increase firm seller power by leveraging power over food
retailers and distributors
The review identified that the key strategic approaches
for dominant food companies to increase their selling
power vis-à-vis downstream actors – that is, the distrib-
utors and retailers of their branded products – involved
vertical integration, control, coordination, and collusion.
‘Forward’ vertical integration is achieved when dominant
food companies acquire a retail or distribution firm, or
the distribution-related assets of smaller distributors
(e.g., dispensing equipment, fridges, and vending ma-
chines) [107, 153, 187, 195, 198, 215, 231]. Vertical con-
trol over downstream actors can be achieved via a
number of trading practices. Some of these trading prac-
tices clearly exploit power imbalances and are thus con-
sidered unfair to the buyer. Important examples include
the use of exclusive dealing arrangements and loyalty re-
bates to control what the upstream actors can sell [99,
174, 181]; the use of ‘product bundling’ (sometimes re-
ferred to as tying) to force buyers to purchase an un-
wanted product [244]; the use of resale price
maintenance, which occurs when manufacturers control
the retail price [99]; and the use of territorial supply
contracts, in which restrictions are placed on cross-
border sourcing, preventing the upstream actor to
source the same goods from other national markets
where they are cheaper [99, 232].
In a similar fashion to both horizontal and back-
wards vertical coordination, forward vertical coordin-
ation occurs when dominant food companies partake
in risk-spreading arrangements with upstream actors
in order to better coordinate the distribution of their
branded products [206, 228, 233]. Finally, the review
identified evidence of dominant food companies col-
luding with upstream actors by entering into price-
fixing arrangements for their branded processed food
products [63, 103]. A notable example was the
branded bread price-fixing scheme that occurred in
Canada between 2001 and 2016 in which colluding
firms agreed to coordinate price increases on at least
15 occasions [103].
Leverage informational power asymmetries in their
relations with consumers
The review identified a number of important ways that
dominant food companies leverage information-based
power asymmetries over consumers. Although it could
be justified that all forms of intense and aggressive mar-
keting communications are an expression of power by a
firm over a consumer, we primarily focused on strategies
and practices described as being exploitative and mis-
leading in nature primarily from a consumer law
perspective.
It was revealed that dominant food companies often
use marketing practices that specifically target vulner-
able population groups [13–16, 234]. As a pertinent ex-
ample, dominant food companies were reported to have
used sophisticated integrated marketing communication
practices – combining communication practices such as
marketing, advertising, promotions, and public relations
– to target young children who do not have the cogni-
tive ability to understand and evaluate marketing strat-
egies [14, 15]. Moreover, on occasions, dominant food
companies were reported to bombard children through
the simultaneous use of multiple marketing channels,
such as TV ads, in-school marketing, product place-
ments in popular programs and movies, and online plat-
forms [15, 16]. The use of online platforms can be
particularly exploitative given that large firms are able to
collect and use extensive amounts of personal data from
young internet users to deliver behavioural-based preci-
sion marketing [11]. Another vulnerable population
group that dominant food companies were shown to tar-
get, predominately through outdoor advertising prac-
tices, were people living in lower income
neighbourhoods [13, 234].
The review identified a number of cases in which
dominant food companies were shown to have taken ad-
vantage of informational asymmetries over consumers in
relation to food labelling, composition and production
processes. Such information based power asymmetries
are of notable concern given that product and process-
related information cannot easily be found or verified by
consumers upon consumption [33, 235, 236]. A number
of practices were identified that were considered mis-
leading under consumer law. For instance, the use of
misleading representations was reported, including the
use of the phrase ‘school canteen approved’ [236]. The
use of misleading health claims was also observed, such
as Heinz’s claim in the Australian market that one of
their products was healthy and nutritious for children, a
claim that was subsequently proven to be inaccurate
[237]. The alleged use of misleading food composition
was also identified in a case in which a dominant food
company’s ‘pomegranate-blueberry’ juice beverage was
found to contain more than 99% apple and grape juice
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[235]. Furthermore, it was reported that dominant food
companies often use a range of marketing practices on
packaging in order to influence consumer purchasing
behaviour, such as the use of words with no legal or for-
mal meaning (e.g. natural), the use of unfinished claims
(e.g., ‘25% less added salt’ without stating a comparator),
irrelevant claims, the use of healthy sounding brand
names (e.g. ‘Go Natural’), and the use of ‘greenwashing’
labels (i.e., the practice of marketing a product as being
ethical and ecologically friendly without it truly being
so) [140, 238].
Key cross-cutting practices used to achieve multiple
strategic objectives
A number of key cross-cutting practices were identified
that can be deployed by dominant food companies to
achieve multiple strategic objectives. First, the acquisi-
tion of other companies or their assets can fulfil different
strategic objectives depending on the type of transaction
(e.g., horizontal, vertical) and its geographical boundaries
(i.e. domestic, transnational). Second, and in a similar
manner to firm acquisition, partaking in risk-spreading
arrangements (e.g., joint ventures) with other firms can
be used to achieve a number of strategic objectives.
Third, investing substantial amounts of money into inte-
grated marketing communications can be used to in-
crease consumer demand relative to rivals, drive dietary
displacement away from alternative food products, and
raise barriers to market entry. Fourth, investing substan-
tial amounts of money into product and process-related
research and development and where possible, protect-
ing developed assets via through intellectual property
channels, can reduce rivalry by creating new market seg-
ments and heighten barriers to market entry. Fifth, col-
lusion can achieve different strategic objectives
depending on the parties involved in the arrangement.
Finally, the control and manipulation of consumer and
supply chain related data can be used to fulfil different
strategic objectives depending on which market-based
actors are exploited by the resulting informational
asymmetries.
Discussion
The paper identified a number of market strategies and
related practices used by dominant food companies to
consolidate their power, and categorised these strategies
according to six interconnected strategic objectives. Ef-
fectively, these six strategic objectives outline how mar-
ket strategies can be deployed by dominant food
companies to leverage power asymmetries within the
market environment, especially over consumers, small-
scale food producers, smaller manufacturing rivals, and
small-scale retailers and distributors. The strategies were
identified from a diverse range of literature, including
public health, social sciences, competition law and pol-
icy, and business and strategic management. The evi-
dence quality and risk of bias of the data sourced from
the identified documents were assessed using a novel ap-
proach, in which data collected from peer-reviewed arti-
cles, court case proceedings, and authoritative reports
from inter-governmental organisations were considered
to be of higher quality than data sourced from online
media content, market research reports, and working
papers.
Public health implications of market strategies used by
dominant food companies
There are three broad and interconnected manifestations
of public health concern that result from market-based
power imbalances that favour dominant food companies:
i) the ability to generate profits from anti-competitive
behaviour that can then be used to fund corporate prac-
tices that undermine public health; ii) the ability to
shape retail food environments in ways that promote
consumption of unhealthy foods and beverages; and iii)
the ability to structure food supply chains that are
geared towards the production of cheap inputs used in
the manufacturing of unhealthy processed food prod-
ucts. Critically, these public health concerns do not rely
on an assumption that smaller, less powerful companies
are likely to be more public health conscious. Instead, a
central argument for limiting market-power in this area
is that smaller, less powerful companies are likely to lack
the material resources, capacity and co-ordination re-
quired to undermine public health in such a systematic
way.
First, and fundamentally, dominant food companies
can leverage their market power vis-à-vis all market-
based actors to generate and accumulate profits in ex-
cess of what would be possible in competitive market
environments. The implications of this, besides the
broader issues of misallocation and maldistribution of
resources, is that dominant food companies are able to
accumulate excessive material capabilities, which in turn
can be used to fund costly corporate practices that have
the potential to undermine public health efforts to im-
prove population diet quality. Some of these corporate
practices have non-market dimensions, e.g., lobbying,
public relations, investing in scientific research and front
groups, and donating to political candidates and cam-
paigns, which serve to influence the interconnected pol-
icy, regulatory, institutional, ideological and broader
socio-political structures that shape market environ-
ments [19]. Other corporate practices that are often
funded, at least in part, by profits made from anti-
competitive behaviour include a number of market-
based practices analysed in this paper. Notably, large
food companies devote a substantial amount of
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resources to create and disseminate intense marketing
and related communication strategies that fundamentally
serve to maintain and increase consumer demand [2, 85,
245]. As a case in point, the advertising budget of The
Coca-Cola Company alone in 2019 (approximately USD
4.25 billion) was nearly the same as the entire 2018–
2019 programme budget of the World Health
Organization (approximately USD 4.42 billion) [246,
247]. In many cases, these marketing and communica-
tion practices are carefully designed to manipulate and
distort consumer judgement [248]. Furthermore, domin-
ant food companies have the ability to rapidly adapt
their marketing and communication strategies to exploit
events and dynamics that take place in the broader
socio-political environment (e.g., Black Lives Matter
movement, COVID-19 pandemic) [249–251].
A second important public health implication of the
market power of dominant processed food manufac-
turers is that it increases their ability to directly shape
retail food environments – in some cases via the use of
anticompetitive practices, such as exclusive dealing ar-
rangements and slotting fees. There is widespread recog-
nition that unhealthy food environments, in which
unhealthy food products are widely available and heavily
promoted, are a major driver of unhealthy diets and
obesity globally [5, 252]. Accordingly, where market-
based power imbalances favour companies that generate
profits from the sale of unhealthy food and beverages, it
is likely to negatively affect population diets and related
health outcomes.
Third, the market power of dominant processed food
manufacturers over small-scale producers can promote
and reinforce the production of unhealthy processed
food products, particularly in cases where the product
portfolios of dominant manufacturers are mainly com-
prised of unhealthy food products. In order to remain
economically viable, small-scale producers often have lit-
tle choice but to produce commodity crops for domin-
ant processed food manufacturers, instead of engaging
in diverse crop production for healthier and more sus-
tainable local food systems [4, 53].
There are also a number of manifestations of market
power in which the public health implications are less
clear. For example, the entry and penetration of ‘health-
ier’ substitute markets by dominant food companies,
largely in response to consumer concerns and trends,
could, on the surface, be perceived as beneficial for pub-
lic health. The drive to differentiate and diversify prod-
ucts, for instance, based on issues of sustainability (e.g.,
shifting towards plant-based proteins) and health (e.g.,
promotion of fortified, functional and formulated food
products) could lead to some public health benefits [18,
29, 253]. However, the public health community must
remain vigilant in exploring whether these potential
benefits are outweighed by more fundamental issues,
such as how these strategies might lead to further con-
solidation of power in the hands of dominant food com-
panies. Proponents of corporate technology-orientated
solutions to improve population diet quality often con-
tend that consolidated corporate power is not a concern
in and of itself, given that powerful transnational firms
are best placed to mobilise the necessary resources [4,
18, 53, 254]. Critics of this view, however, have pointed
out that such a way of thinking is reductionist and could
lead key policy makers to favour policy solutions that
maintain the power of manufacturers of unhealthy foods
at the expense of policy solutions that more comprehen-
sively reform the healthiness of food systems [4, 53, 156,
254–256].
External factors that shape (and are shaped by) market
strategy
Although the main context of analysis of this paper was
the market environment, it is important to highlight that
interconnected factors ‘external’ to the market environ-
ment – i.e. the broader economic, political-legal, socio-
cultural, demographic, technological, and ecological sys-
tems and processes – shape, and are shaped by, the mar-
ket strategies of dominant food companies [21, 24, 257].
In this respect, market strategy analysis should not be a
stand-alone inquiry, but instead serve to complement
both non-market corporate strategy analyses and the
examination of how underlying systemic processes, dy-
namics and paradigms (e.g. globalisation, liberalisation,
financialisation) can facilitate and promote corporate in-
terests over those of public health [6].
Market structures and market strategies are heavily
shaped by underlying global and jurisdictional political
economies. For instance, the market strategies of domin-
ant food companies are influenced by trade and invest-
ment policy [116, 258, 259], competition policy [100],
food and agricultural policy [113, 260], and fiscal and fi-
nancial policy [261]. Such policies, laws, regulations and
institutions vary significantly across jurisdictions. Market
strategies, for instance, are less likely to be regulated in
liberal market economies, in countries with weak regula-
tory institutional arrangements, or if they are trans-
national in nature and operate transboundary across and
within states [262, 263]. Broader economic structures
and processes also play a key role in shaping the market
strategies of dominant food companies. For example,
globalising economic processes, such as the integration
of trade, investment, information and knowledge flows
into global value chains, have enabled and promoted the
emergence of enormous transnational food corporations
[29, 80, 116]. Furthermore, the economic development
that has occurred in many countries in recent decades
has increased the purchasing power of a greater number
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of consumers, in turn boosting the sales growth of
branded processed food products [2, 264]. Conversely,
consumer confidence and the sales of branded processed
food products have tended to drop during macro-
economic shocks, such as those associated with financial
crises, which often lead to currency devaluation, in-
creased unemployment and inflation [86, 265].
A range of socio-cultural and demographic drivers
have facilitated population-level dietary shifts from
freshly prepared meals to ready-to-consume, processed
food products, notably urbanisation, the rise in paid em-
ployment for women and their engagement in less trad-
itional gender-based roles, irregular working hours, a
desire for cheap and convenient meals, reduced family
size, and an increase in one-person households [91, 126,
170, 205]. Dominant food companies have also been able
to harness ideas and values linked with modernisation
and social desirability to aggressively market their
branded food products, especially in emerging markets
[91].
Market strategy is also shaped by technology-related
innovations. Pertinent examples specific to dominant
food companies include scientific developments in food
processing and nutrition research (e.g. nanotechnology
and biotechnology) [18, 108, 167, 209]; technological in-
novations in transportation and storage (e.g. just-in-time
transportation technologies, cold chain technology)
[132]; improvements in communication technology [91,
108]; Big Data platform technologies (especially with re-
gard to targeted and integrated marketing) [201, 266];
and food production-related technological innovations,
such as those that increase and standardise commodity
production [33, 267].
Policy implications and actions to address market-based
power imbalances
One of the goals of market strategy analysis of dominant
food companies from a public health perspective is to iden-
tify policy actions that have the potential to address the
market-based power imbalances that drive unhealthy diets.
It is important to note that, while the focus of this paper is
on policies designed to protect and promote public health,
there are clear and important interconnections between
public health goals and broader social and ecological goals.
Competition policy, at least in principle, plays an im-
portant role in regulating food supply chains by ap-
proaching and enforcing issues such as merger control,
unfair trading practices, and vertical abuse of power [99,
153, 263]. Horizontal, vertical and cross-border merger
control can prevent transactions that would further con-
solidate the market power of dominant food companies,
as well as regulate their entry and penetration into emer-
ging markets [63, 153, 263, 268, 269]. Additionally, the
strengthened enforcement of unfair trading practices
and vertical abuses, such as the use of slotting fees and
‘category captaincy’, could play an important role in pro-
moting healthier food environments by reducing the
ability of dominant food companies to control retail
shelf space [175, 178, 179].
However, it has often been argued that most competi-
tion policy regimes around the world have limited scope
to promote healthier food systems [270, 271]. One fun-
damental reason for this is the narrow economic ap-
proach used to interpret consumer welfare in
competition-related decision making. Notably, consumer
price (and, to a lesser extent, availability and innovation)
typically trumps broader social and ecological concerns,
such as the healthfulness of food environments, in con-
sumer welfare assessments [269, 271, 272]. This narrow
economic approach to consumer welfare promotes the
idea that cheap, widely available and unhealthy food
products are beneficial, and not detrimental, to con-
sumer welfare [272, 273].
One approach to reforming competition policy that
has the potential to benefit public health could be to in-
tegrate the right to food, and in particular the right to
adequate food, into the interpretation and application of
competition policy [272–274]. Such an approach could
ensure that competition authorities facing a choice be-
tween different interpretations of competition law in-
volving dominant food companies (e.g., during
assessments of proposed mergers) would be required to
select the option that best protects and promotes public
health whilst preserving the process of competition
[273]. Similarly, broadening the scope of competition
policy could help to counter industry group opposition
to the implementation of certain public health policies,
such as health-related taxes, on the grounds that they
would distort competition [261, 272, 275–277]. There
are important legal precedents in which the social bene-
fits of implementing health-related taxes have been con-
sidered to outweigh the social costs of the potential
distortion of competition. In 2018, for instance, the
European Commission decided that the scope of the
sugar-sweetened drinks tax implemented in Ireland was
consistent with the health and nutrition objectives pur-
sued by the government, and would not distort competi-
tion in an unduly manner [278].
Curbing the power of dominant food companies, as
part of efforts to build healthier food supply chains,
could also be partly achieved through policy action that
supports food producers to participate in local and di-
versified food production, instead of being locked into
commodity crop production. For instance, governments
across different levels of governance could invest in in-
frastructure supporting local food supply chains for per-
ishable products (e.g. improved transport and cold
storage infrastructure); supporting farmers to engage in
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direct sales (e.g. participation in produce markets) and
local processing and value-adding activities (e.g. food
hubs); the upgrading of health, food quality and phyto-
sanitary legislation to help small producers overcome
existing restraints; increasing support for alternative
food business models (e.g. food cooperatives); developing
integrated agricultural knowledge and innovation sys-
tems that could help to address information asymmet-
ries; and public procurement policies that mandate the
procurement of healthy, local and sustainable food prod-
ucts [269, 279, 280].
Policy actions that support vulnerable consumers over-
come information-based power imbalances are also
likely to play an important role in promoting healthy di-
ets. For instance, countering exploitative marketing prac-
tices could be partly achieved via the prohibition of
marketing, including digital marketing, of unhealthy
foods to children, and the ban of unhealthy food market-
ing in school areas, on low shelves or checkout counters
in supermarkets, and in TV programs scheduled at times
when children typically watch TV. Packaging-related in-
formation asymmetries could also be partly overcome by
establishing mandatory front-of-pack labelling schemes
[269, 281, 282]. Finally, vulnerable consumers could be
supported through policy actions that focus on health
and diet quality equity. Such actions include those de-
signed to improve the affordability and accessibility of
healthy food alternatives, such as tax exemptions and
subsidies on fresh produce and taxation of unhealthy
products, urban policy that focuses on the distribution
of healthy food options in deprived and vulnerable urban
neighbourhoods, and greater access to fresh drinking
water [269, 279, 283].
Contribution to the public health literature
The typological framework presented in this paper is
well-placed to inform a comprehensive examination of
the market strategies and related practices used by dom-
inant food companies within and across jurisdictions.
Such studies will require the development of specific
protocols to guide analyses. One example of a future re-
search avenue could be to examine the market strategies
used by a specific company, such as The Coca-Cola
Company, across multiple countries over an extended
period of time. Another potential research avenue could
be to identify the aggregated market strategies used by
the dominant market players of a specific food industry,
such as sugar-sweetened beverages, within a specific jur-
isdiction. In both cases, research could include an exam-
ination of the use (or lack thereof) of remedies
implemented by the relevant national competition au-
thorities in response to the deployed market strategies.
More broadly, the presented market strategy frame-
work can assist public health efforts to understand and
address the ways in which corporate strategies influence
health. To date, the majority of corporate strategy frame-
works within the public health literature have largely fo-
cused on the non-market dimensions of strategies
deployed by firms active in health-harming industries [9,
284–287]. This emphasis on non-market strategy is well
targeted, particularly in highly regulated industries such
as tobacco, wherein firms have substantial incentives to
secure favourable policy and regulatory environments to
the detriment of public health [288]. Yet, firms in
health-harming industries deploy both market and non-
market strategies to consolidate power and maximise
profits. Although a number of studies in the field of pub-
lic health have, collectively, examined a variety of market
strategies used by firms across a number of health-
harming industries [245, 289–295], the approach to
examine market strategies has not been systematic in
the same way it has been for non-market strategies. In
this respect, the presented typological framework could
be used to complement existing political strategy ana-
lyses of dominant food companies [296–299], thereby
broadening understanding of the wide range of corpor-
ate strategies used by dominant food companies that in-
fluence health and diet. Furthermore, this paper could
serve as a blueprint for future public health research to
systematically review the market strategies used by cor-
porations in other food sectors (such as retail and food
service), as well as corporations in other health-harming
industries.
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
A key strength of this paper is that it is a systematic re-
view covering a range of literature – notably public
health, business, strategic management, and competition
policy – that explores market strategy from a number of
different perspectives. Furthermore, we used a novel ap-
proach to assess evidence quality and risk of bias. An-
other key strength of this paper is that it uses Porter’s
Five Forces framework to inform market strategy ana-
lysis, a framework that is very well-established through-
out the business and strategic management literature
and is well-placed to explore market-based power asym-
metries. Although the use of Porter’s Five Forces in the
public health literature is not novel, to the best of our
knowledge this is the first public health paper to use
Porter’s Five Forces framework to systematically analyse
the use of market strategies used by corporation active
in any health-harming industry or sector.
The paper has a number of important limitations.
First, given the nature and subjectivity of interpreting
power, there was an inevitable element of subjectivity in
the way we framed different strategies according to the
six strategic objectives. Second, there are clear intercon-
nections and crossovers with a number of the strategies
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discussed, particularly in light of the difficulty in accur-
ately delineating and defining food product markets and
market segments. For example, there is a clear overlap
between market segmentation, product differentiation
and product diversification strategies, as well as the
strategies linked with increasing consumer demand and
building brand value. Third, it is important to note that
certain sectors of the food industry may have unique
market characteristics that cannot be generalised to the
food manufacturing sector more broadly. For instance,
breast milk substitute manufacturers may attempt to
control distribution channels, such as health care and
pharmaceutical channels, that are not generally used by
firms active in other sectors of the food industry. Finally,
this paper focused on dominant firms considered to pri-
marily be processed food manufacturers. It is important
to note that dominant companies from other functional
levels have also integrated into the food manufacturing
sector. The market dominance of actors in other sectors
– such as powerful retailers (e.g., large supermarket
chains), commodity traders (e.g., Archer Daniels Mid-
land) and meat or dairy processors and wholesalers (e.g.
WH Group, Fonterra) – can confer specific competitive
advantages not covered in this paper. Given this limita-
tion, a potential avenue for future research could be to
look at the market-based power asymmetries specific to
the different functional levels of the food value chain.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a novel typological market
strategy framework specific to dominant food companies
and their use and consolidation of market power vis-à-
vis other market-based actors. Informed by Porter’s Five
Forces framework, the presented framework outlines key
market strategies and related practices in relation to six
key strategic objectives. The presented framework is
well-placed to inform analysis of market strategies used
by dominant food companies as part of public health ef-
forts to understand and address the ways in which the
use of corporate strategies by dominant food companies
can undermine public health and diet quality. In
addition, the presented market strategy framework is
well-placed to identify leverage points within a specific
jurisdiction that could be targeted by policy actions to
address market-based power imbalances. Notably, com-
petition policies related to merger control and the mis-
use of market power have the potential to create
healthier food systems. Given that in many cases compe-
tition authorities fail to incorporate the necessary range
of social and ecological considerations that concern soci-
etal welfare, the public health community should aim to
position itself as an important driver of competition pol-
icy reform that truly takes consumer welfare and public
interest considerations into account.
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